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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-430

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES

ET

ux.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[May

, 1983]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a
search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraband
in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gates'
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit submitted in support of the State's application for a warrant to
search the Gates'i property was inadequate under this
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964)
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search
warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous
informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this question, however, we requested the parties
to address an additional question:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST

"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
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that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with
the Fourth Amendment."
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari,
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not
addressing the question regarding modification of the exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982,
-U.S.
.
I
....
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from VWDWHFR
courts
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
·state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari,
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23,
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.

Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of

§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the
rrJudiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with noJurisdiction unless
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these requirements do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranclr. 344

(1809). 1
1

v

The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v.

California, 401 U. S. 797, 805-806 (1971).

Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not pressed or

passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction. /
In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1. (1949), the Court reversed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v.
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily

reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 479, n. 3, that it possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court
the question on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so connected with it in substance as to form but another ground or
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued.
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely
In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in
2
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented
below and those involving entirely new questions.
The application of these principles in the instant case is not
entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated by the actions of the. Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be excluded from their
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been
violated. The State never, however, raised or addressed
the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should
be modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was
considered.
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2,
38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court toreview state court decisions even when a claimed federal right
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a State's failu~ to raise a defense to a federal right or
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the assessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant argued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not received personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising
from a single factual occUITence, the two claims "are not in anywise necessarily connected," id., at 198. Because of this, we concluded that appellant's taking claim could not be considered.

81- 4:30-0PIN ION
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have challenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are
those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969).
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges modification of an existing constitutional right or accompanying
remedy. Here, for example, the record contains little, if
anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the police officers that searched the Gates's property-which might well
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith ex-

ception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the
mooification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit
from a record containing such facts.
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie
Generate, 309 U. S. 430, 43~36 (1940), demands that those

courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important,
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an adequate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra,
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to

•
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions indicate, see
, supra, or prudential, as several of
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere,
we need not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may
be, consideration of the question presented in our order of
November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifications for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we
thus decide not to pass on the issue.

The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the
1
federal exclusionary rule suppressing evidence against respondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morris on v.
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to con-

•

sider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's contract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that with-

out such a contest, the routine restatement and application of
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not
pressed or passed upon below'' rule. Similarly, in the
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amendment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modi-

fied rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary

81-430--0PINION
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to apprise ~he state court o:t: the arguments for not applying
the exclusionary rule, we ( will not consider the question
whether _t_he exclusionary rule should be modified.
Likewise we do not believe that the State's repeated opposition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally" and not ''a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.

See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980);
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modi-

fication or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for

purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the
State courts.
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against
our considering the question presented in our order of November 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Suffi-

cient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971)

81-430-0PINION
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C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U. S. 387, 413--414 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring); Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437, 443 444 (1981) (REHN(BURGER,

J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public /
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion.
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual
QUIST,

record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the framing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts,
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our customary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are rendered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions.
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates
that we reserve for another day the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.

II
We now turn to the question presented in the State's original petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated 'by the search of their car

and house. A chronological statement of events usefully introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb
•
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in
your town who strictly make their living on selling
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it
back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance
will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At

the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and
make their entire living on pushers.
I guarentee if you watch them c~refully you will make
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates

Greenway
in Condominiums"

The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who decided
to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had
been issued to one Lance Gates residing at a stated address
in Bloomingdale. He contacted
confidential informant,
whose examination of ce a1n
ncial records revealed a
more recent address for the Ga es, nd he also learned from a
police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates" had
made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West
Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May

5 at 4:15 p.m.

81-430-0PINION
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and
that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition,
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale
was approximately 22 to 24 hours.
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts,
and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The
judge of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the

modus operandi of the Gates had been substantially corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had
headed .north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had flown
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, an<;} his wife, returned to their
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left
West Palm Beach some 22 ho·urs earlier. The Bloomingdale
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana.

81-430-0PINION
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A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons,

and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe that the
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are inclined
to agree that, standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to
the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the
basis for a magistrate's determination that there was proba- ble cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas,

378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States,
290
41 (1933).

u. s.

The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that
Detective Mader's affidavit might be capable of supplementing the anonymous letter with infortnation sufficient to permit a detennination of probable cause. See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit
in fact did not contain sufficient additional infortnation to sustain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 3 The Illinois
In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a
particular apartment, which the telephone company aid contained two
3
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Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood
Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each
of two independent requirements before it could be relied on.
J·. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as supplemented by Mader's affidavit, first had to adequately reveal
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter writer-the particular
means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this par-

ticular case.
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a
confidential reliable infonnant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers submitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his constitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some
of the underlying circumstances'' indicating that "the informant . . . was
'credible'" or that "his information [was] 'reliable."' Aguilar, supra, 378
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Agui lar's requirement
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he claimed they were. We
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient detail''
to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393 U. S.,
at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, however, that
the tip lacked the requisite detail to pennit tnis "self-verifying detail"

analysis.
4
See, e. g., Stanle v. State, 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In urnmary, these rules osit that the "veracity'' prong of the pinel l. te t has

81-430-0PINION
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satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because, "there was simply no basis [for] . . . conclud[ing) that
the anonymous person [who wrote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible." J. A., at 7a. The
court indicated that corroboration by police of details con-

(

tained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong, ,
and in any event, could not do so if, as in ,the present case,
only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A. 1 at 12. In
addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois court
understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip
to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter

failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference.
Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had
been made.
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are

two "spurs''-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his information. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the
''reliability'' spur of the "veracity'' prong. Both the "basis of knowledge"
prong and the "veracity'' prong are treated as entirely separate requirements, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sustain a determination of probable cause. See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements.
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "veracity'' prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not capable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity"
prong. /d., at 12a.

The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test'' observes that "[t]he built-in
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, t at a slipshod application calls
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote
omitted).'' The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve

analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting.'' I d., at 857.

•
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all highly relevant in determining the value of his report.

We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements 1
to be rigidly exacted in every case, 5 which the opinion of the v
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed
below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular

place.

III

Thls totality of the circumstances approach is far more con- /
sistent with our prior treatment of probable cause 6 than is
The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have assumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision,
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra.
6
Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v.
Texas, 318 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause,
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In
Aguilar, we required only that:
the magistrate must be infonned of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he
5

claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which
the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his infonnation 'reliable.''' /d., at 114 (emphasis added).
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentalization of the inquiries into an informant's "verncity," "reliability'' and ''basis
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an informant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two particular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v.

United States, ,381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to belie e the

defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income ta e .

com-
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~ny rigid ,de~and that specific "tests" be satisfied by every
I~ormant ~ tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our deciSions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a
"practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). "In dealing with probable
cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabil-

J

ities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." ld., at 175. Our
observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable
to the probable cause standard:

The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same and so are
Jaw enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of li-

brary analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular

factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in
mented that:
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires

,

that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable hi·m to
rnake the J·udgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently
supported to J·ustify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal
process." !d., at 224-225 (emphasis added).
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many sh~pe_s and sizes from many different types of persons.
~~we said I~ :4da~s v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972),
~rmants tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to
a P_oli~~ma~ on ~~e scene may vary greatly in their value and
reliability.
Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation."

Ibid. 7

The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the totality of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257,
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip.
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petitioners at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of
probable cause.
Likewise, in Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), the Court
upheld a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to be7

lieve that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment.
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home.
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable,
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs.
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that information within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment

provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there.
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police observed Ker and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached
Ker's car, and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's
modus operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. Moreover, when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy

he managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U-turn. Finally, the
police had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable in-
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More~ver, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two
largely mdependent channels-the informant's "veracity" or
/

"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according
these two elements such independent status. Instead, they
are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra,
407 U. S., at 14~147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573
(1971).
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles
formation previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that
his source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence
of information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in understatement." I d., at 36.
8
Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reasoning that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted
police-affiant."

1

J
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his tip to greate
· h
.
Unlike a
. r we~g t than might otherwise be the case.
balan
totahty of Circumstances analysis, which permits a
i . .ced asse~sn:~nt of the relative weights of all the various
ndi~:a ~f rehab1hty (and unreliability) attending an inforn:an s tip, ~he "t:vo-pronged test" has encouraged an excesSIVe~y tec~mcal dissection of informants' tips, 9 with undue attent~on bemg focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its
Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, reflect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed robbery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invalidated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun.
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifically described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above described premises appeared to him to be cocaine.'' The warrant issued on
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because ''There is no indication as
to how the infonnant or for that matter any other person could tell whether
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar
or salt.'' /d., at 689.
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant,
stat
to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant
suppl· police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli.
9
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~~al acceptation, means less than evidence which would just~ condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under

c~cumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we
~ru~ ~hat "the quanta . . . of proof' appropriate in ordinary

JUdicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have /
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of crimin.al activity is the standard of probable cause."
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft
1972).
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108.
(_Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U. S. 345, 34&-350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that
many warrants are quite properly, ibid.-issued on the
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more

formal legal proceedings.
· ewiSe, given the context in
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v.
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "twopronged test" are particularly troubling.
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.
tiny by courts of th
ffi .
y said that after-the-fact scruthe form of d
e su . Ciency of an affidavit should not take
e novo review A m . t t , "
. .
of probable caus h
· . ag1s ra e s determination
ing courts " S ~ s l~_uld be paid great deference by reviewin
· . ptne. t supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudgg or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants"
.t ' V en tresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent
WI h the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not invalidate . . . warrant(s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." Id.,
at 109.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate,
police might well resort to warrantl~ss searches, with the
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search.
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1, 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud(ing]"
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United

States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation
We also have said that "Although in a particular case it may not be
easy to detennine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
be largely detennined by the preference to be accorded to warrants,"
10
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of this standard bett
er serves the p
course to the warrant r
urpose of encouraging reour traditional defe p ocedure and Is more consistent with
tions of magistrate rt~nce .to th~, probable cause determinaFinall th . s . an Is the two-pronged test."
oorly y, e ,?IrectiOn taken by decisions following Spinelli
P
serves
the most .bas1c
. fu nct·Ion of any government":
"t
.
e~ P!;0 v,~de. for the security of the individual and of his propy.
Without the reasonably effective performance of the
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J.; dissenting).
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged

test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Committee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise,
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous \
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of V
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes."
While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting

j

r<'

.

Ventrescat supra,}380 U. S., at 109. This reflects both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not,
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli.
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such tips is required b th
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that leaves virtually y
Fourth Amendment, a standard
mants is not.
no P ace for anonymous citizen inforFor all these reason
don the "t
s, we cone1ude that it is wiser to aban- / I
A ·z
wo-p~onged test" established by our decisions in
·
11
a~ and Sptnelli. In _its place we reaffirm the totality - - - - -0
e Circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable c~use determinations. See Jones v. United States,

f:J:

supra; Untted States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply

to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity'' and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probabilit that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[in "
t probable cause existed. Jones v. United States,
su n , 62 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this flexib e, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommoThe Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN,
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 585-586 (1971), noted
his long-held view "that Spinelli . . . was wrongly decided" by this Co::.=-::>---..
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Likewise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spine t ormulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." SA Moore's Federal Practice ~ 41.04 (1981).
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would,
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause,
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a useful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by ome of its
11

language.
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dation of pubI.
.
m
Ic and privat .
fr~nt req~ires than does et~:terests that the Fourth Amendm Agut~ar and Spinelli.
approach that has developed
. Our earher cases illust
Istrate may not ventur:a~e ~he ~imits beyond which a magstatement of an affiant tha I~ Issumg a warrant. A sworn
believe that" liquor ill
t he has c~use to suspect and does
located on cert .
egal~y brought mto the United States is
United States 2~n premises will not do. Nathanson v.
vide th
. ' 0 U ·. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must proth
.e magistrate With a substantial basis for determining
e eXIstence. of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory
statement at Issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that "affiants have received
relia?I~ information from a credible person and believe" that
herom Is stored in a home, is lik~wise inadequate. Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue.:§
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and
/
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed V
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli.
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent suggests in several places
that the approach we take today somehow downgrades the

role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar and Spinelli
"preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of
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b elieve is th
. . . Post at 14
.
'
e case Th '
· Quite th
requirement of th .F
e essential protect. e fcontrary' we
v U ·t
e ourth A
d
Ion o the warrant
[the nt ed ~tates, 333 U. S. ~~n lment, _as.stated in Johnson
d
usual Inferences which r ( 948), Is m "requiring that
ence] be drawn b
easonable men draw from evistead of being jud ~ ~ neutral and detached magistrate inpetitive enterpris~e f the ~fficer engaged in the often comNothing in our o .. o . erretmg out crime." !d., at 13--14.
magistrate to d Pillion m any way lessens the authority of the
the m t .
raw such reasonable inferences as he will from
1
d d ah er1a
. supplied to h.Im b Y app1·Icants for a warrant· inS e~ ' .e IS freer than under the regime of Aguilar 'and
Pt_nellt to draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if
- he Is so minded.
The real gist of JUSTICE BRENNAN's criticism seems to be
a second argument, somewhat at odds with the first, that
magistrates should be restricted in their aUthority to make
probable cause determinations by the standards laid down in
Aguilar and Spinelli, and that such findings "should not be
authorized unless there is some assurance that the information on which they are based has been obtained in a reliable
way by an honest or credible person." However, under our
opinion magistrates remain perfectly free to exact such assurances as they deem necessary, as well as those required
by this opinion, in making probable cause determinations.
JUSTICE BRENNAN would apparently prefer that magistrates
be restricted in their findings of probable cause by the development of an elaborate body of case law dealing with the "veracity'' prong of the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken
down into two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the
"reliability'' of his information, together with the "basis of
knowledge" prong of the Spinelli test. See n. 4, supra.
That such a labyrinthine body of judicial refinement bears
any relationship to familiar definitions of probable cause is

r

j

hard to imagine.

Probable cause deals "with probabilities.
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T hese are not t
.
conside t.
echmcal; they ar th
dent ra Ions of everyday life one .e factual and practical
St
men, not legal techn· .
Which reasonable and pruates, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (;c~~~s), act," Brinegar v. United
JUSTICE BRENNAN'

.

.

such as 'practical ' ' s disse~t also suggests that "words
used in the Court'~ ~o?techmcal,' and 'common sense,' as
0
permissive att•t
d
Pinion, are ?ut code words for an overly1
the right
u e towards pohce practices in derogation of
17. An s secured by the Fourth Amendment." Infra, p.
easy, but not a complete, answer to this rather florid
t
. we know about Justice
-Is atement would be that nothmg
Ruted~e suggests that he would have used the words he chose in
Bnnegar in such a manner. More fundamentally, no one
doubts that "under our Constitution only measures consistent
with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by government to cure [the horrors of drug trafficking]," post, at 17;
but this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment. "Fidelity" to the commands of the
Constitution suggests balanced judgment rather than exhortation. The highest "fidelity'' is achieved neither by the
judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the

most bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively goes
furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of governmental authorities. The task of this Court, as of other ,
courts, is to "hold the balance true," and we think we have
done that in this case.

IV

Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of
corroboration of details of an informant's ti
independent
police work. In Jones v. Uriited States, supra 362 U. S., at
269, we held that an affidavit relying on
say "is not to be
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~e Insufficient on that
basis for crediting the h
s~ore, so long as a substantial
say that even in m ki earsay Is presented." We went on to
rely upon irrf,
~ ng a warrantless arrest an officer "may
than u
. or~ation received through an informant rather
pon ~Is direct observations, so long as the inf~rmant's
Sta t ement
"th. h 1s reasonablY corroborated by other matters
": ~n t e office:'s knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recog~e t.he probative value of corroborative efforts of police ofCials I.n Aguilar-the source of the "two-pronged test"-by
observmg that if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue "an entirely different
~
case" would have been presented. ' Aguilar,. supra,
378
U. S., at 109, n. 1.
Our decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959), however, is the classic case on the value of corroborative efforts of police officials. There, an informant named
Hereford reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown
slacks and black shoes and would be walking "real fast."
'
.
I d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for h1s

infonnation. 12
On one of the stated dates "fl.Olice officers observed a man
matching this descriptio e a train arriving from Chicago;
I·

The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only reference to Hereford's reliability was that he had ''been engaged as a 'special
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money,
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no
indication of how Hereford came by his information. At most, the detailed
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford obtained his information, it was reliable.
12

28
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lus attire and lugga
~al~ng rapidly. ~= :atc~ed ~ereford's report and he was
m his investigation th plam~d m Draper that, by this point
ified every facet of ihe ~~rrestn~g o~cer "had personally vercept whether et·t·
ormatwn ~ven him by Hereford ex1
the three oun p
~o~er
~ad
acc~mphshed
his mission and had
surely with ces 0 ermn o"!l his person or in his bag. And
in th'
every other hit of Hereford's information beus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable
g
f"ounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Here- /
~ord' · .c
·
. s IDJ.ormation-that
Draper would have the heroin with
him-was likewise true," id., at 313.
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone, the
facts obtained through the independent investigation of
Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the GatesWere
involved in drug trafficking. In addition to being a popular
vacation site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA,
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in /
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by Mader's
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme
The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details contained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corroboration of innocent activity," J. A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in
13
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o lmois reasoned th
.
wh? had given reliable i at Drr:per Involve? an informant
~hile the honesty and r lin~~~ation
on previous ?ccasions,
In this case w
e a 1 ty of the anonymous Informant
While this disti er~ u~nown to the Bloomingdale police.
ncbon might be an apt one at the time the police de rt
l
. pa.fi ment received the anonymous letter it became far
ess Sigru cant after Mader's independent inve~tigative work
~~curred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that
e Gates's car would be in Florida that Lance Gates would
fly to Florida in the next day or
and that he would drive
t~e car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not
With certainty, that the informant's other assertions also
were true. "Because an informant is right about some
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli,
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring)-including
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to
satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we ~
think it suffices. for the practical, common-sense judgment
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is

so:

the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,

36 (1963).

This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to
require otherwise would be'f o sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands.
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable
cause. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a
detennination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether par...,;

ticular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of su picion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.
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enough, for purposes 0 f
.
"conoboration th
assessmg probable cause, that
the chances 0 f rough other sources of information reduced
ing "a s b t ~ ~ecki:ss or prevaricating tale," thus providU .t d Su s antia basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v.
;-. e tates supra,\ 362 U. S., at 269, 271.
I~a11Y' t~e anonymous letter contained a range of details
:elatmg not JUst to easily obtained facts and conditions existIng .at t~e time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
?rd1nar1ly not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate
Information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves,
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gates's alleged illegal activitieS. 14 Of
The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in the anonymous informant's letter-its statement that Sue Gates would fly from Florida to Illinois, when
in fact she drove-and argues that the probative value of the entire tip was
undermined by this allegedly "material mistake." We have never required that informants used by the police be infallible, and can see no reason to impose such a requirement in this case. Probable cause, particularly when police have obtained a warrant, simply does not require the
perfection the dissent finds necessary. Moreover, the character of the informant's "mistake" does little to reduce the reliability of the informant's
tip. Sue Gates's decision to revise her travel plans is no different from the
last-minute changes that travellers frequently are wont to make. It
scarcely is reasonable to require the informant to have predicted this kind
of change, as well as the other details that he was right about.
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's argument that the Gates's action in leaving their home unguarded undercut the informant's claim that
drugs were hidden there. Indeed, the line-by-line scrutiny that the dissent applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that we find inappropriate in './
reviewing magistrate's decisions. The dissent apparently attributes to
the magistrate who issued the warrant in this case the rather implausible
notion that persons dealing in drugs always stay at home, apparently out of
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by criminals. If accurate, one could
14

not help sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation of people so situated.
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course, the Gates's t
.
from a talkat·
. ravel plans might have been learned
pronged t t"Ive neighbor or travel agent; under the "twodetail . :~ developed from Spinelli, the character of the
. t1 s m e anonymous letter might well not permit a suffiCien Y clear inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of
knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra,
,
P~obable cause does not demand the certainty we associate
WI~~ formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained
his entire story either from the Gates or someone they
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter's
predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent,
therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a "substan~ tial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search
the Gates's home and car existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be

Reversed.

In reality, however, it is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever thought
that the anonymous tip "kept one spouse" at home, much less that he relied
on the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter simply says that Sue
would fly from Florida to Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates's
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in their house, or those in their
car, unguarded. The magistrate's determination that there might be
drugs or evidence of criminal activity in the Gates's home was well-supported by the less speculative theory, noted in text, that if the infonnant
could predict with considerable accuracy the somewhat unusual travel
plans of the ~' he probably also had a reliable basis for his statements
that the Ga (s's]Eept a large quantity of drugs in their home and frequently
were visited by other drug traffickers there.

?

~ ·

